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because a grazing permit is not a compensable property right. The
appellate court stated that the Taylor Grazing Act, the express terms of
the lease, and relevant case law all affirm that a grazing permit is not a
compensable property interest.
Furthermore, the appellate court affirmed the holding that the
impoundment and sale of Klump's cattle was not a taking. Regulation
of property rights does not 'take' private property when an individual's
reasonable investment-backed expectations can continue to be
realized as long as he complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions.
The BLM's actions were consistent with Klump's reasonable
investment-backed expectations. The appellate court reasoned that
the BLM permit conditions and numerous warnings put Klump on
notice that the BLM would seize and sell his cattle. Accordingly,
Klump had no reasonable expectation that his cattle could trespass on
federal land.
The appellate court upheld the federal claims court decision that
the BLM had not affected a Fifth Amendment taking of Klump's water
rights and claims. The Appeals Court held that while sovereign acts
may give rise to a Fifth Amendment taking, mere assertions of a right
of property do not. In obtaining the water rights to the Badger Den
Allotment, the BLM acted in its proprietary capacity and received the
same treatment under state law as a private owner.
Jason Turner
Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding: (1)
the impact of a challenged regulatory taking must be evaluated in
terms of its effect on the landowner's parcel as a whole in
consideration of wetlands regulation; and (2) the determination of the
fair market value of property allegedly taken inherently factors in
inflation).
Dolores, Stanley, and Albert Walcek, and Regina Ammons
("Walceks") sued the United States, claiming the government's
regulation of their property constituted a taking. The United States
Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint on the merits. The
Walceks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal District.
The Walceks purchased 14.5 acres of real property in 1971. In
1972, 13.2 acres of the property became subject to regulation under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") as federally regulated
wetlands. In 1988, the Walceks submitted a series of applications to
the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") for authority to fill and
develop the land pursuant to section 404 of the CWA. In 1993, the
Corps denied approval of the Walceks' development plans, and
proposed alternatives, which the Walceks considered economically
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unviable.
The Walceks filed a complaint before the Court of Federal Claims
in 1994. In the complaint, the Walceks alleged a permanent taking
based on the Corps's denial of their permit request, and also that the
decision rendered useless the economic value of their property. In
1996, after the Walceks filed their complaint, the Corps issued a
permit to the Walceks, which authorized the development of 2.2 acres
of the property. The Walceks were not satisfied with the conditioned
permit, whereby they were required to keep eleven acres undeveloped,
and persisted with the complaint.
The Court of Federal Claims limited the trial to the issue of
whether the 1996 permit affected a regulatory taking. Although the
Walceks never formally amended their complaint to address the 1996
permit, the trial court tried the issue by the implied consent of the
parties. The Walceks argued that the 13.2 acres of wetlands on their
property constituted the relevant parcel for reviewing a possible
categorical regulatory taking. Because the 1996 permit allowed 2.2
acres of development and did not deny the Walceks all economically
beneficial use of the land, the court held that no categorical taking
occurred. However, the court noted the Walceks could have shown
the regulation effected a taking according to the factors articulated in
Penn Central Transportation v. City of New York ("the Penn Central
Factors"). Absent a categorical taking, the Penn Central Factors
permit a property owner to prove that a regulation affected a taking
pursuant to specific factors. But, after comparing the Walceks' facts
with the Penn Central Factors, the court concluded the wetlands
regulations of the Walceks' land pursuant to the 1996 permit effected
no compensable taking.
On appeal, the Walceks maintained that a recent United States
Supreme Court decision provided grounds for treating the eleven
acres in question the Corps prohibited development on as the relevant
parcel for the regulatory takings analysis. The Walceks alternatively
argued that the Federal Court of Claims improperly applied the Penn
Central Factors, and therefore erred in concluding the 1996 permit
did not constitute a taking.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal District
declined to consider the Walceks' argument that the relevant parcel
for the takings analysis was the eleven acres the 1996 permit required
be left undeveloped. The court refused to consider this issue on the
grounds that it had not been raised in the court below. It also found
no error in the lower court's analysis of the Penn Central Factors, or in
the conclusion that the Walceks suffered no compensatory taking.
Further, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's refusal to
adjust the value of the Walceks' property for inflation before
determining whether the Walceks would be able to realize a profit
under the 1996 permit. The court held that the proper determination
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of the fair market value of property inherently factors in inflation, and
any additional adjustments would be unreasonable. Thus, the court
affirmed the dismissal of the Walceks' complaint.
Mark Shea
SECOND CIRCUIT
Altman v. Town of Amherst, No. 01-7468, 2002 WL 31132139 (2nd Cir.
Sept. 26, 2002) (holding that a determination of whether a point
source discharge of properly used pesticides into waters of the United
States requires an NPDES or SPEDS permit will remain undecided
until the EPA interprets whether the Clean Water Act includes this
type of discharge).
Michael and Susan Altman ("Altmans"), residents of Amherst, New
York, commenced a suit against the Town of Amherst ("Amherst") in
the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, civil penalties, and attorney's
fees for violations of permit requirements of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The Altmans alleged that Amherst violated the CWA by
spraying pesticides for mosquito control in federal wetlands without a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit or
a State Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("SPDES") permit.
Amherst argued they only needed a permit from the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") to spray
pesticides for mosquito control when the city discharged the pesticides
directly into United States' waters. After a failed settlement attempt,
Amherst filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted
Amherst's motion. It held that no issues of material fact existed and
that pesticides, when used for their intended purpose, do not
constitute a pollutant as defined by the CWA. Further, the court
decided that the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA") more aptly applied to this particular situation. Finally, it
granted Amherst's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
Amherst only needed a DEC freshwater permit to spray pesticides.
The Altmans appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit raising three issues: (1) FIFRA did not foreclose,
preempt, or supercede the permit requirements under section 402 of
the CWA; (2) state and federal acquiescence to Amherst's discharges
without a CWA permit was unlawful; and (3) good-faith use of
pesticides even for their intended purpose did not make the spray
something other than a pollutant according to the meaning of the
CWA. The appellate court vacated the decision and remanded the
case to the district court.
The CWA permit requirements apply when a party discharges a

